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GOOD FAITH IN LABOR NEGOTIATIONS:
TESTS AND REMEDIES
James A. Gross,* Donald E. Cullent and Kurt L. Hanslowel
One of the most delicate tasks of our labor policy is that of ensuring that employers and unions discharge their statutory duty to bargain
collectively in good faith.1 The task. is delicate because of the difficulty
of policing a subjective state of mind. The good faith test is but a subtle
legislative effort to assure sufficient governmental intervention to produce genuine and effective collective bargaining, without unduly reaching into the substantive content of private collective bargaining
relationships. In other words, the good faith test seeks to prevent sham
or surface bargaining while leaving the parties a wide latitude in
selecting their negotiation tactics. Likewise, the outcome of bargaining
is intended to reflect the desires and strengths of the parties rather than
a governmental judgment by the National Labor Relations Board or by
the courts as to what are reasonable positions or fair results.
The mere statement of these policy aims suggests the hazards and
controversy that have always surrounded the good faith test. Implementation of the test entails not only the juggling of these somewhat
conflicting policy goals, but, because a negotiator's state of mind must
usually be inferred from his objective conduct, it also requires an appraisal of conduct in situations where "normal" behavior often includes
bluffing, name calling, impugning of motives, and threats to substitute
coercion for persuasion. Moreover, a strong and determined employer
can evade good faith bargaining for several years, even if he is ultimately found to have breached his statutory duty. When the day of
reckoning does arrive, the remedies applied by the Board-primarily
a cease and desist order and an affirmative order to bargain in good faith
upon the request of the other party-are often too little and too late.
Proposals for reform reflect opposite stances. One view suggests
that the good faith test has outlived its usefulness, and that employers
and unions, protected in numerous ways by other provisions of the
* Associate Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. BS.
1956, LaSalle College; M.S. 1957, Temple University; Ph.D. 1962, University of Wisconsin.
t Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. B.A. 1946, Hobart
College; MS. 1949, Ph.D. 1953, Cornell University.
$ Professor of Law and of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. B.A.
1947, Yale University; LL.B. 1951, Harvard University.
1 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a)(5), 61 Stat. 141 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
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labor laws, should be left free to come to such terms as they may, without governmental supervision.2 Another advises strengthening the bite
of the good faith requirement by intensified use of section 10(j) injunctions, closer scrutiny of bargaining postures and stratagems, affirmative
inclusion of substantive requirements in NLRB orders, and imposition of retroactive remedies.3
The pitfalls of the good faith test can be illustrated by re-examining three of the best known cases on this issue: two involving the Steelworkers' prolonged and abortive effort to establish a bargaining
relationship with the Reed 8c Prince Manufacturing Company over the
period 1937-1954,' and a 1964 NLRB decision condemning General
Electric's bargaining strategy known as Boulwarism. 5 Each case invited
imposition of the good faith requirement and its attendant remedies;
their application, however, proved of little value to the aggrieved party.
In general, the NLRB and the courts have tended to be too quick to
condemn and too loath to punish. They have been overly zealous in
iaputing bad faith to employers' negotiating behavior, while applying
the mildest of penalties to those most deserving condemnation. Thus,
there is a need for both a narrowing of the area of conduct to be considered bad faith bargaining, and a strengthening of the penalties to be
applied to that conduct.
A middle course should be steered between the extreme positions
of scrapping or extending the duty of good faith bargaining. The law
can and should encourage the parties to discuss their differences before
resorting to open conflict. For example, it is both reasonable and
feasible to require that negotiators give adequate notice of their intention to terminate a contract, be willing to meet at times convenient to
both sides, be vested with some authority, provide relevant information,
be willing to sign a written agreement, and, provided this duty is interpreted more carefully and consistently than in the past, make reasonable counterproposals.
This necessitates the abandonment of the totality-of-conduct doctrine. When the good faith test is pushed to the extreme position in
2 INDEPENDENT STUDY

GROUP,

COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,

THE PUBLIC

INTEREST IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 81-82 (1961).
3 P. Ross, THE LABOR LAW IN AMTbON: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
UNDER THE TAFr-HARTLEY ACT 30-82 (1966). See Ex-Cell-O Corp., NLRB Trial Exam. Dec.

80-67 (Case No. 25-CA-2377, 1966); Zinke's Foods, Inc., NLRB Trial Exam. Dec. 662-66
(Cases No. 30-CA-372, 30-RC-400, 1966).
4 Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 944 (1939), enforced, 118 F.2d 874 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941); Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951),
enforced, 205 F.2d 131 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
5 General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964).
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which a party's total bargaining behavior can be condemned although
no single act is illegal in itself, the test is too easily abused in appraising
past conduct and is ineffectual as a guide to future conduct. The
totality-of-conduct approach is particularly weak when it relies on
employer communications and unorthodox negotiation tactics for evidence of motive. Finally, existing proposals for stronger remedies in
this area are appropriate only if the Board is willing to exercise greater
restraint in applying the good faith test.
I
Tm

REED 9C PRINCE MANUFACTURING COMPANY CASES

The United Steelworkers of America (at the outset known as the
Steelworkers Organizing Committee-SWOC) made two principal and
largely unsuccessful efforts to establish collective bargaining with Reed
& Prince-a medium-sized, family-owned enterprise that manufactures
nuts, bolts, screws and related products. Both attempts resulted in unsuccessful strikes and judicially enforced NLRB rulings that the company had failed to discharge its duty to bargain in good faith with the
union. Each of the union's legal victories was followed by a: substandard
contract and the demise of the union as an active and representative
entity.
A.

The First Case: The Initial Attempt to Unionize, Bargain, and
Reach a FirstContract

SWOC's first attempt to organize Reed & Prince produced cards
signed by about ninety percent of the employees authorizing SWOC as
their bargaining representative. 6 Chester Reed, the company president,
indicated a willingness to recognize the union,7 and, despite his initial
anxiety,8 a preliminary agreement was reached on March 19, 1937, three
days after the first bargaining conference. 9 The contract included a
provision for the parties to meet not later than April 2, 1937 to work
6 Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 944, 948 (1939).
7 C.IO. Levels Three Demands at Reed &i Prince, Worcester Telegram, March 17,
1937.
8 At the first bargaining conference on March 16, 1937, the employer inquired about
SWOC's plans for organizing his principal competitors, so that Reed & Prince would not
be placed at a competitive disadvantage.
9 The contract contained company recognition of SWOC as the bargaining representative for its members (the union did not seek exclusive recognition), a 12V2% increase in
all base and piece rates, an 8-hour day and a 40-hour week. 12 N.L.R.B. at 949. The
agreement was ratified by an almost unanimous vote of the union members and was
signed by Chester Reed on March 19, 1937. Reed & Prince and 0J.O. Sign, Worcester
Telegram, March 20, 1937.
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out a more comprehensive agreement, but in five subsequent bargaining conferences the parties failed to agree on a final contract.10 The
union struck on May 25, 1937.11 The company submitted a signed
contract as its final offer to the union on June 3, 1937.
On the issues still in dispute, the proposed contract provided for a
grievance procedure without arbitration, citizenship as a consideration
in promotions and layoffs (a position which caused the union deep
concern), no pay for holidays, no access to the plant for a union delegate, and a provision designed to prevent SWOC from requesting a
closed shop or a checkoff at any time in the future.' 2 In an accompanying letter sent to all employees, Chester Reed told union officials:
We had 52 years of peaceful, harmonious, relations with our
employees until you and the C.I.O. became "intermediaries" for
our workers
...The law .

.

. for the present ...

forces us to deal with

you-and, as U. S. citizens (despite your dislike of them and desire
to exalt the alien) we still, speaking for the company, do and will
obey the law.
Judging from the many unsolicited letters received by the management from our employees, you will undoubtedly find that the
great majority of them are anxious to return to work, are opposed
to this C.I.O. sabotage of their wage earning capacity, and will enthusiastically welcome your prompt signing.'8
1. Company Propaganda:Evidence of Bad Faith but not Illegal
per se
In determining that the company had deliberately intended to
avoid agreement with the union, as opposed to simply bargaining
"hard" on some issues, the NLRB relied heavily on the company's
publicity campaign. Company representatives admitted that their attitude toward negotiations did change after the preliminary agreement,
but claimed justification for the change in a union vote authorizing a
strike and in alleged communist influence in the CIO.14 The union and
10 They tentatively agreed on a preamble, four sections dealing with recognition,
wages, hours of work, and vacation-issues largely covered by the preliminary contract.
There was no agreement on issues such as grievance procedure, holidays, access to the
plant for a union delegate, minimum production standards, or the inclusion of citizenship
as a consideration in promotions and layoffs. 12 N.L.R.B. at 952.
11 Id.

12 Id. at 952-53.
13 Id. at 953.

14 Given a verbal promise that there would be no strike for a year, Chester Reed
was upset by a union vote authorizing its negotiating committee to call a strike should
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the Board, however, attributed the company's shift in attitude to its
two new bargaining representatives, who brought with them an approach to labor-management relations that was novel for the 1930's:
A labor crisis today demands new methods for quickly and
skilfully organizing public opinion-methods which capital until
recently has been too proud or too indifferent to accept. Force and
bloodshed are entirely unnecessary; also the thick-headed guards,
the provocative private detectives, and questionable characters of
all types, who practice the so-called 'Art of Strike Breaking'. Instead
of these strong armed men, a scientific staff swings into action to
present the facts, to organize public opinion, to defend business
against the attacks of labor racketeers. Spot news men, reporters,
wire men, statistical men land at the strike headquarters. Government, Federal, State and Local laws... are at their finger tips, or at
the end of a telephone. Every conference is planned; the military
strategy of warring armies is no more carefully prepared than that
of a big industrial dispute.... The strategy of the opponent is carefully watched, checked and in many cases pre-diagnosed.' 5
The Board found that, instead of trying to settle the strike by
collective bargaining, most of the company's activities centered on a
publicity campaign.' 0 Bulletins, cartoons, reprints of correspondence,
and copies of radio addresses were mailed to all employees. Some of
these communications referred to the union and its methods as "alien"
and "Un-American." Others imputed pecuniary and corrupt motives to
the union leaders. A third technique consisted of outright abuse and
name calling which characterized the CIO as a "gang of sluggers, communists, radicals, and soap box artists, professional bums, expelled
members of labor unions, outright 'scabs' and.., red affiliates."' 1
By the third week of the strike, the propaganda strategy bore fruit.
A group of employees organized a back-to-work movement and by
July 12, over half of Reed & Prince's employees had signed a petition
authorizing acceptance of the June 2, 1937 contract offer and terminanegotiations fail. Alarm was also caused by newspaper articles charging SWOC with a
disregard for contracts and for causing a complete industrial relations upheaval around
the country. Id. at 950.
15 Id. at 954. Jay Clark, who had a reputation for being "firm" with unions, replaced
Reed & Prince's former counsel, and recommended the services of Charles Gallagher,
whose firm conducted public relations work and was subsequently engaged for that purpose by Reed & Prince. The quotation appeared in a magazine article written earlier by
Gallagher.
180 Id. The Board considered it significant that Gallagher maintained a file of newspaper clippings which linked the CIO with communism, sit-down strikes, and industrial
warfare, and discussed the material with Reed & Prince officials. Id. at 951.
17 Id at 956.
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don of the strike.'8 Reed & Prince reopened its plant doors on July 14,
and approximately 380 strikers returned by the following day.19
The NLRB found unanimously that the employer violated the
National Labor Relations Act by abandoning, after an initial posture of
cordiality, Pl willingness to come to terms with the union.2 0 Support
for this conclusion was found in part in the employer's vituperative
publicity-campaign which, although not declared illegal in itself, was
viewed as designed to undercut the authority of the union. The NLRB
decided that the back-to-work movement was the desired result of the
company's propaganda and that the signing of the petitions was "the
result of the exhortations and admonitions" in the literature.2 1
The-Board's reaction to the company's communications is difficult
to accept. The quote concerning the bargaining representatives' labor
relations philosophy, the fact that their office "was equipped with
mimeographing machines and mailing facilities ' 22 and a file of derogatory news clippings, 2 and the fact that the company's communications
disparaged the union and its leaders are treated as if their mere existence made the employer's guilt self-evident. Although it is reasonable
to disapprove of the company's choice of policy and to deplore the
employer's language, such practices are often an accepted part of the
strategy of collective bargaining-each party praises his own bargaining
position and motives and damns the other party, scorns its demands,
impugns its motives, and castigates its leaders. Surely, this was mild
stuff given the usual conduct of labor relations in the 1930's.
A further example of the Board's curious reading of the company
literature is its response to the following June 14th "dispatch to employees" from Chester Reed:
They [the employees of Reed & Prince] ... are realizing that the

only way they can ever get back to work is to go down to the union
meeting, demand the right to have the contract signed by the union
officers, and take a written ballot, supervised by their own people,
and not a group of aliens and foreigners, to go back to work.2 4

18 Id. at 959-60. The group had obtained the assistance of an attorney, Charles
Ward Johnson. At a meeting in his office, it was agreed that it would be "good sportsmanship" if the CIO, which had caused the strike, be given the chance to lead the men
back. When SWOC declined, Johnson annexed the signed petitions to the company's
proposed contract and notified the union that Reed & Prince had signed a contract with
a majority of its employees, now represented by Johnson.
19 Record, vol. 3, part 2, at 1099, 1353-54, 1378-79, NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co.,
118 F.2d 874 (lstCir. 1941).
20 12 N.L.R.B. at 969-71, 978.

21 id. at 961.
22 Id. at 954.
23 See note 16 supra.
24

12 N.L.R.3. at 958.
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The NLRB, focusing on the derogatory nature of the words "aliens
and foreigners," decided that Reed meant to discredit and "stigmatize"
the union. It is, however, at least as plausible to select for emphasis the
fact that Reed did not replace the strikers with non-union men but
rather sought union approval of the company contract by means of a
secret ballot vote held at a union meeting.
2. The NLRB Remedy and the Demise of the Union
Since the Board ruled that the company's propaganda was not an
unfair labor practice per se, it did not order Reed &Prince to stop communicating with its employees or to alter the content of its communications-and therein lies the most serious weakness of the Board's
approach. Because legal actions are used as evidence of an illegal motive,
there can be no order to stop committing any specific wrong. The NLRB
has no remedy other than an exhortation to the company officials to
start thinking right.
The NLRB also based its finding of a refusal to bargain upon the
company's rejection of four union attempts to continue collective bargaining after the commencement of the strike: through a "conciliator"
from the United States Department of Labor on June 5; a request on
June 9 for a "private conference" with management from Clinton
Golden, Regional Director of SWOC; a meeting before the Massachusetts State Board of Arbitration and Conciliation on June 28; and a
mediation effort by the Mayor of Worcester on July 15.25 Reed &Prince
maintained that under the law it was free to ignore the suggestions of
third parties.2 6 The Board did not find the company guilty per se of a
refusal-to-meet violation of section 8(a)(5), but it refused to consider
these acts in isolation:
[C]onsidering the negotiations prior to the strike, and the whole
course of the respondent's violently anti-union conduct subsequent
to the strike, we find that these were part of a larger plan to avoid
any concessions that would be acceptable to the Union and in the
meantime to break the ranks of the Union so that collective bargaining would be unnecessary. 27
Id. at 962-69. The Board noted that:
The first two efforts made by the Union to meet with the respondent after
the beginning of the strike, were utilized by the respondent merely as material
from which to mold propaganda which it directed to its employees in an effort
to forestall bargaining with their duly designated representatives. At the meet25

ing before the State Board, the respondent held firmly to all the provisions
of the contract except for the one concession . . . which it must have realized
was so insubstantial as to be no concession at all. The fourth overture through
the mayor met with a flat refusal.
Id. at 970.
26 Id.

27 Id.
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The totality approach left Reed : Prince without specific instructions from the Board concerning elimination of particular activity in
order to meet its legal obligations. The NLRB did, however, order
Reed &-Prince to bargain collectively at the union's request.2 8
This remedy also proved most inadequate. Although the NLRB
2
decision was sustained in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
the legal battle did not end until the Supreme Court, on July 2, 1941,
denied the company's petition for review. 0 By this time, the local union
was crippled and totally inactive. The international SWOC organization, "with the employees within the plant afraid to become active in
the union," signed a "substandard" agreement with Reed & Prince on
October 3, 1941. 31 When the local asked the company to reopen the
contract on February 3, 1945, Reed & Prince raised the question of the
majority status of the union and the issue went to the War Labor Board.
In September, 1945, the union filed for certification with the NLRB
but was unable to obtain sufficient signatures to meet the Board's requirements. The War Labor Board case was dropped and the local was
82
officially deemed collapsed.
B.

The Second Attempt at Bargaining:InferringBad Faith from the
Substance of the BargainingPositions

In a 1950 NLRB election following an organization drive of several
months, the production and maintenance employees of Reed & Prince
voted 449 to 304 in favor of representation by the United Steelworkers
of America. 8 The union made an initial attempt to bargain several days
later, but the first negotiations did not take place until September 15,
1950. 3 4 Ensuing negotiations once more proved fruitless, and were

followed by a strike and refusal-to-bargain charge. The Board, this time
by a divided vote, again found the employer to have breached its statutory duty to bargain:
We conclude, therefore, that the Respondent exhibited bad
faith in the bargaining negotiations, and we rely especially on the
following facts: (1) The delay in scheduling the first meeting and
28 Id. at 978-80.
29 NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1941).

30 313 U.S. 595 (1941).
31 Hearings on Reed & Prince Manufacturing Co. Labor Dispute Before the Subcomm. on Labor and Labor-Management Relations of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, 175-79 (1951).
32 Id. at 4.
33 Id.; Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850, 851 (1951). See also Reed & Prince

Union Vote Today, Worcester Telegram, July 12, 1950.
34 96 N.L.R.B. at 851.
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in furnishing the wage and pension data; (2) the insistence upon
the presence of a stenotypist at the bargaining sessions; (3)the unreasonable withholding of acquiescence on admittedly trivial
matters, such as notice-posting facilities and the recognition clause;
(4) the hasty institution of the wage increase after the negotiations
had broken down, without notifying the Union or in any way permitting the Union to share in the35credit for the increase; and (5)
the handling of the checkoff issue.
1. The Totality-of-Conduct Approach: Legal Acts Can Lead to
Bad Faith
As in the first case, the NLRB found no clear refusal to meet, but
rather a lengthy series of sterile bargaining sessions. Thus, the employer's motives had to be inferred from circumstantial evidence, and
using this test the Board concluded that:
Although no one of the separate elements in this case is in itself
conclusive evidence of bad-faith bargaining, when the entire bargaining pattern of the Respondent is viewed in its totality and the
individual items are appraised together, the picture [of bad faith]
is clear. 36
Reed 9c Prince claimed to have delayed the commencement of negotiations for six weeks because of the previously arranged vacations of
the company bargaining team. The Board questioned whether the
company "would have delayed, for such a relatively long period of time,
negotiations for a business contract or a bank loan," and decided that,
when appraised "in the context of the Respondent's whole course of
conduct," this delay "was another aspect of the Respondent's calculated
effort to avoid reaching an agreement with the Union while preserving
the appearance of bargaining."37 The company's explanation for the
delay of two months in responding to a union request for certain wage
and pension data was similarly tested. The explanation-the impreciseness of the initial union request and the subsequent illness of two employees in its industrial relations department-although plausible on
its face, became further evidence of bad faith when viewed as part of
Reed &:Prince's entire course of conduct.38 The majority also believed
that the comphny's insistence on a stenotypist to take down a verbatim
transcript of the negotiation sessions was evidence of bad faith, since it
was not the usual approach of a good faith participant in collective
bargaining. The practice was "not conducive to the friendly atmosphere
35 Id. at 858 (footnote omitted).
36 Id. at 857.
37 Id. at 852-53.
38

Id.
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so necessary for the successful termination of the negotiations", and was
"condemned by experienced persons in the industrial- relations; field."80
The critical weakness of 'this totality approach is as clear here as it
was in the first Reed & Prince case: because legal acts were used as evidence of an illegal motive, the Board could not order the company to
discontinue any specific violation. The Board compounded the .problem by taking note of the first Reed 6- Princecase:
The Respondent is not experiencing laborrelations, difficulties
for the first time. More than 10 years ago, a predecessor of the
Unionsought recourse to the Board in a not too dissimilar situation, and it was not until the Board issued an Order and the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit enforced the Order that the Respondent negotiated a collective bargaining agreement. We have
scrupulously avoided prejudging the Respondent because of its
rather unsavory labor relations history, but the Board is not required by law to ignore this history. Accordingly, in evaluating
the evidence in this case, we have given some weight to this
factor.40
Along with the problem of prejudgment, the NLRB's extension of
its search for evidence of the employer's current state of mind, to events
adjudicated a decade earlier gives rise to some apprehension about the
potentially limitless range of the.totality approach, Similarly, the condemnation of the use of a stenotypist by "experienced persons" seems
inadequate support for a conclusion of law.
2. The Reasonableness of the Company's Proposals
Although the two Reed & Prince cases were similar in several
respects, the second has become better known because it so, clearly
involved an evaluation by theBoard of the reasonableness of the employer's substantive bargaining positions. The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit held that the Board, in testing an employer's good faith,
must satisfy itself that the oyer-all attitude and position of the company
reflects an honest endeavor to make collective bargaining work. The
court agreed that although, the Board is not to "'sit in jidgment upon
the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements,'" it "is not
to be blinded by empty talk and by the mere surface motions of collective bargaining .
"41 Thus, the Board must consider the reasonableness of the employer's bargaining positions.
The principal union demands were: a wage increase of at least
fifteen cents an hour; a grievance procedure ending in arbitration; some
89 Id. at 854.
40
41

Id. at 857 (footnotes omitted).
NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (lst Cir. 1953).

1019

LAB3OR"NEGO TIA TIONS10

1968]

form of union security (either a union shop or a, maintenance-of-membership clause); a checkoff of union dues; six paid holidays; a pension
plan; pnd a seniority, provision. The union also sought the right to
post noncontroversial noticds on the company bulletin boards, an expansion of the &mpany's proposed recognition clause, and a leaves of
42
absence provision.

-

'

The bulletin board issue, although trivial in substance, illustrates
the Board's reasonableness approach. The NLRB recognized that Reed
8c Prince was under no legal obligation to make its bulletin boards
available to the union, but noted "that the granting of such posting
permission is a 'common industrial practice. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to us that the Respondent, if itwas dealing in good faith, would
have offered to the Union some sort of posting facilities."'4 Reed &
Prince had also amended the union's proposed recognition clause to
include the first proviso of, section 9(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which
gives employees the right to present their grievances directly to management without the intervention of the union. 4 The company, however, was unwilling to incorporate the second proviso of that section,
granting the union the right to be present at the adjustment of such
grievances. A majority of the Board believed that, once Reed 9: Prince
insisted on the first proviso of section 9(a), "if it were seeking a good
faith disposition of issues, it would have readily acceded to the Union's
natural request to include the second proviso." 45 Thus, a refusal could
not be made in good faith.'
IThe court of appeals, after a review of the reasonableness of all
the bargaining proposals of the parties, carried the Board's approadh
to the substance of the proposals even further:
Thus if an employer can, find nothing whatever to. agree to in an
ordinary current-day contract submitted to him, or in some of the
union's related minor requests, and if the employer makes not a
single serious proposal meeting the union at least -part way,
in
least,
at th
certainly the Board must be able to conclude that'this is
some evidence of bad faith-.

.46

42 Id. at 135. Reed, & Prince offered, the union a 10-cent increase provided no fkirther
negotiations be held on this point. The Steelworkers rejected the offer but stated~that,
since it regarded the various economic, benefits as a single "package," it might agree to
the 10-cent increase once the company stated its position on pensions, insurance;,and paid
holidays. Reed & Prince would not agree to the Steelworkers' other demands but did
explain its objections on all points. Id. at 135-37.
43 96 N.L.R.B. at 854. ,
•
44 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964)...
. -.. , ,
'45 96 N.L.RB. at 855.
46

205 F,2d at 134.

,,
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The court continued:
In other words, while the Board cannot force an employer to make
a "concession" on any specific issue or to adopt any particular
position, the employer is obliged to make some reasonable effort
in some direction to compose his differences with the union, if
§ 8(a)(5) is to be read as imposing any substantial obligation
at al1.a7
3. A Proposed Good-Faith Test as Applied to Reed & Prince
If section 8(a)(5) of the Taft-Hartley Act is to impose "any substantial obligation at all," then the NLRB can and even must make an
assessment of the reasonableness of the parties' substantive bargaining
positions. The scope of the reasonableness test, however, should be
narrowed.
Certain collective bargaining offers are clearly difficult to reconcile
with good faith bargaining. An example is one employer's proposal of
"no union shop, no employee eligible for union membership until six
months after hiring, arbitration cost borne by requesting party, a 15
per cent per hour reduction of wages for all employees, and a ten-year
contract with a 2 per cent annual minimum automatic wage increase
plus merit increases at the discretion of the employer." 48 Other offers
are dearly consistent with or even better than the "ordinary currentday contract." The difficulty is in evaluating the reasonableness and
good faith of offers that fall somewhere between these almost selfevident examples-such as the offer in the second Reed & Prince case.
The company's November 22 contract proposals were not as barren
as Judge Magruder maintained in the First Circuit's decision. 49 Reed
c Prince did agree to a grievance procedure, albeit one without arbitration, and the company stressed that it did not ask the union to agree
to a no-strike clause-thereby acknowledging the quid-pro-quo relationship later celebrated by the Supreme Court.50 Furthermore, al47 Id. at 134-35 (emphasis in original). The court added an element not specifically
relied on by the Board-the company's November 22 contract proposal. According to
the court:
This [proposal] was a brief two-page document . . . [which] had no provisions
as to wages, grievance procedure, or the other major items which the Union had
proposed for inclusion in the contract. It is difficult to believe that the Company
with a straight face and in good faith could have supposed that this proposal
had the slightest chance of acceptance by a self-respecting union ....
Id. at 139.
48 P. Ross, THE GOVERNMENT As A SouRcE OF UNION POWER 228 (1965).
49 For text of the company's proposals, see Hearings, supra note 31, at 188-91.
50 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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though the November 22 proposals contained no wage clause, Reed &
Prince had not retracted its earlier offer of a ten-cent wage increase
and, as the court pointed out, the company was responding to the
union's November 10 contract proposal "which was complete except
for a wage clause." 51 The Reed 8&Prince offer was certainly not in the
same category as the above example of a fifteen percent wage reduction
and a ten-year contract.
The NLRB and the courts should find bad faith only on the basis
of offenses that can be identified precisely, and to which precise remedies can be applied. This "identifiable offenses" approach, applied
to the record of the Reed & Prince negotiations, demonstrates that contracting the NLRB's discretion need not limit the Board to finding
per se violations and provides, instead, an effective good faith test in
these more difficult cases.
For example, Reed &cPrince maintained that since section 302 of
the Taft-Hartley Act "makes it a criminal offense for management to
pay a labor organization any money,"52 the checkoff was not a bargainable issue. The company was dearly mistaken and its refusal to negotiate this issue was a violation of the law. The company also objected
to the union's proposal for leaves of absence on the ground that it was
not its practice to grant such leaves of absence.53 At the hearing before
the trial examiner, however, the Board introduced in evidence a Reed
&Prince employee handbook that read in part: " 'This [section relating
to employee service credits] does not apply to cases where the Management has granted in writing permission for Leave of Absence.' "" The
company had made a clear misstatement of fact. Finally, Reed &-Prince's
refusal to incorporate the second part of section 9(a) into the recognition clause was plainly unreasonable.
These identifiable and correctible errors-a clear refusal to bargain on a mandatory subject, a fraudulent assertion, and a dearly
unreasonable position on a substantive issue-can be read together
to reach a conclusion of bad faith. This approach covers more than
purely per se violations, but falls far short of the Board's current totality
doctrine. It would, in addition, provide the parties with specific instructions on how they should alter their behavior to comply with the
law.
51 205 F.2d at 137.
52 Brief for Respondent, appendix at 30, NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d

131 (Ist Cir. 1953).
53 205 F.2d at 137.
54 Id. (brackets in original).
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4. The Remedy in the Second Case and the Second Demise of
the Union
The court of appeals, on June 9, 1953, entered a decree 5 enforcing the Board order that required Reed & Prince to cease and
desist from refusing to bargain with the union, to notify its employees
that the company would not solicit its employees to abandon their concerted activities, and, upon request, to bargain collectively with the
United Steelworkers.56
On June 19, the union-requested an "immediate" collective bargaining meeting57 but bargaining did not commence until July 14.
Negotiations continued into April of 1954 when the Steelworkers
signed an agreement with Reed & Prince. The company agreed to provide a desk on its premises so that the union could collect its monthly
dues at an agreed time and place, and also agreed to the posting of
union notices of a noncontroversial character on bulletin boards provided by the employer. The contract also contained a three-step grievance procedure without arbitration and without a no-strike clause, but
with a provision that the union be given an opportunity to be present
at any grievance adjustment. Finally, the agreement incorporated the
existing wage scale and company policies on reporting pay, hours of
work, seniority (without a citizenship requirement), vacations, and
incentives."8 The union membership's reaction to the contract is illustrated most aptly by the comments of a man who spoke from the floor
when the union leadership presented the agreement to the members:
"Is that all we get after 39 months? Nothing, just nothing?" 59 Approximately three hundred strikers had crossed the picket lines
during the strike. 60 By November 1954, only sixteen men had paid any
dues since the strike ended. The local union president's description of
his experiences during the first weeks of his return to Reed 9c Prince
capture the flavor of the time:
I am going to work... [four employees] stepped out of the
office to greet me with why you dirty rat, you got a hell of a nerve
to come back here, you won't stay here long.., you no good son
55 205 F.2d 131.
56 96 N.L.R.B. at 860-61.
57 Letter from Sidney Grant (attorney for the Steelworkers) to Reed & Prince, June
19, 1953, on file at USWA Regional Office in Worcester, Mass.
58 Agreement between Reed & Prince Mfg. Co. and United Steelworkers, Apr. 26,
1954, on file in the Cornell Law Library.
59 Reed " Prince Strike Settlem'ent Explained, Worcester Evening Gazette, Apr. 24,

1954.
60 Letter from R. E. Gorgeson, Sec'y., Reed & Prince Mfg. Co. to Michael Ryan, Field
Rep., USWA, June 4, 1954, on file at USWA Regional Office in Worcester, Mass.
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of a bitch ... . When I arrived at the time dock, these same people
formed a circle which I had to go through.., and there was the
same profanity ....They followed me upstairs to my department
and grouped, around me . ... I asked how long this was to last of
the two bosses... [they] walked away.., they came again during
the morning; at noon time there was a regular parade of people
going through the department to jeer and point at me . . .and
with smiles inquired if I enjoyed my visitors and assured me I
would receive this kind of treatment for 39 months ...
He wrote again in November of 1954:
After six months of -orking at Reed & Prince, it has become
a living nightmare, truly, I wonder how much longer I can take
it. I look back on the four years I have carried the torch for these
people and think of what it has done to me... I positively have
62
no future.
Today, the union continues to pass information on to a few men working in the Reed &cPrince'plant. The 1954 contract has never been
renegotiated.
Even if the NLRB and court of appeals decisions were justified,
the remedies once again failed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Reed & Prince, despite the sweeping decisions against it, was once more
free of the burden of collective bargaining.
II
THE GENERAL ELECrRIC CASE

The Reed & Prince cases illustrate two problems of the good faith
test when a weak union fails to secure a first contract from a stubborn
employer: (1) how can the latter's intentions be inferred from his acts,
and (2) if bad faith is indeed found to have existed, how can a decision
two or three years after the fact breathe life into the shattered union?
These perplexing problems are by no means the only questions that
arise concerning an employer's good faith. For example, in a study of
all merit cases involving section 8(a)(5) that were filed over a recent
five-year period, it was found that the parties in fourteen percent of
these cases had bargained together for over ten years, and in another
twelve percent for three to ten years.6 3 In such' established relationships,
61 Handwritten Notes of Franklin Knight, Pres., Local 1315, in files of the USWA

Regional Office of Worcester, Mass.
62 Id.
63 P. Ross, THE LABOR LAw IN AcrioN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEss

UNDER THm TAFT-HARTLEY AcT 64 (1966).
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employer tactics (and perhaps intentions) may frequently be more
sophisticated and complex than in first-contract situations-and therefore even more difficult for the Board and courts to appraise.
This is certainly true of the most celebrated of recent 8(a)(5) cases,
in which the NLRB found General Electric guilty of bad faith bargaining for, among other things, following the negotiating approach known
as "Boulwarism." 64 In sharp contrast to Reed gc Prince, General Electric
has been bargaining uninterruptedly with several unions since the
1930's. In the 1960 negotiations which gave rise to the NLRB finding
of bad faith, a comprehensive, three-year contract was concluded with
the principal union, the International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers (IUE), and with most of the other hundred-odd
unions dealing with GE. In subsequent years, two other long-term
agreements have been negotiated by the parties to the 1960 case, the last
increasing wages and fringe benefits by about five percent a year.
Finally, there have been only two major strikes at GE in the postwar
period, one lasting two months in 1946 and the other for three weeks
in 1960. As GE spokesmen are fond of pointing out, this record hardly
suggests a company determined to avoid collective agreements with its
work force. On what, then, did the Board base its findings of employer
bad faith?
The majority opinion cited the following actions of the company
in its 1960 negotiations with the IUE as evidence of its failure to bargain in good faith:
(a) Its failure timely to furnish certain information requested
by the Union during contract negotiations.
(b) Its attempts, while engaged in national negotiations with
the Union, to deal separately with locals on matters which were
properly the subject of national negotiations, and its solicitations
of locals separately to abandon or refrain from supporting the
strike.
(c) Its presentation of its personal accident insurance proposal
to the Union on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
(d) Its overall approach to and conduct of bargaining. 65
The critical issues in this case revolved, of course, around the
fourth charge. It is a nice question whether the Board would have up64 General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964).
65 Id. at 193 (footnote omitted). In a separate concurring opinion, Member Jenkins
disagreed with the majority position on the last two of the above charges, but argued that
the first two had been proved and, in the context of this case, were sufficient evidence in
themselves to "justify a broad remedial order." Id. at 198. Member Leedom, dissenting in
part, agreed with the first three specific charges, disagreed strongly with the broad fourth
charge, and concluded that on balance the majority's finding of bad faith was not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 200-03.
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held this general charge in the absence of the specific violations described in (a) through (c) above. The majority insisted that their determination was "based upon our review of the Respondent's entire course
of conduct" and not simply "its approach to or techniques in bargaining."' As will be seen, however, other language in the majority opinion (and particularly in the trial examiner's intermediate report,
affirmed without change by the majority) strongly suggests that the
Board would have upheld the broad charge even if it had stood alone.
Thus, GE's "overall approach to and conduct of bargaining" is the key
issue and, at the risk of oversimplification, the relatively minor violations described in the first three charges will be ignored.
A. Boulwarism: A First and Final Offer Accompanied by a Propaganda Campaign
General Electric has systematized and articulated its approach to
and conduct of bargaining to a degree reached by few other companies. 67 Developed in the late 1940's under the direction of Lemuel R.
Boulware, a corporation vice president with extensive marketing experience, GE's labor policies can best be understood by the phrase
"job marketing." The company attempts to "market" its jobs and policies to workers in the same general fashion in which it successfully
markets its products to consumers. It determines what the "customerworker" wants through attitude surveys, supervisors' reports, studies of
bargaining developments in other companies, as well as the union's
formal demands. It then fashions a "product" (contract offer) to meet
these desires so far as possible, while also meeting the company's obligations to other groups, such as stockholders and consumers. Finally, it
"merchandises" the result.
The "merchandising" step is the controversial aspect of Boulwarism. The company believes that its first offer to a union should be as
"full and fair" as possible-not the niggardly opener of the typical
bargaining ritual, but all that the company intends to provide in the
final contract. By this technique, GE hopes to establish the same trust
and reputation for fair dealing with its employees that it believes it has
among consumers of its products. If the union can prove the company
offer erroneous in some factual respect, or if the bargaining environment, such as the general price level or settlements in other key industries, should drastically change during the course of negotiations, then
66 Id. at 196.
67 For a detailed and largely impartial description of Boulvarism, see Trial Examiner Arthur Leff's intermediate report, id. at 207-10. For a vigorous and informative
defense of GE's labor policies, see H. NoaTRup, BOuLWAmSm (1964).
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the company professes its willingness to alter its offer. Occasionally, the
company has offered a series of optionsi or otherwise indicated its willingness to change the mix of its bargaining package. But GE flatly
refuses to change the size of its first-offer package in order to play the
haggling game, stave off a strike, or make the union negotiators look
good to their constituents. If the union does not like this -first and final
offer, of course, it has every right to strike-and GE, in turn, has the
right to try to run its plants during any strike.
This merchandising strategy also calls for-the company to advertise
its bargaining wares as aggressively as its consumer products. The company feels that union officials can hardly be expected to describe the
company's proposal to the workers impartially, much less enthusiastically; therefore, the company must present its case directly to the
workers as well as to their representatives. Many employers communicate their views to employees during negotiations, of course, but few
do so on the scale of GE. During the 1960 negotiations and strike, for
example, the company directed 246 eparate written communications
to the workers in its Schenectady plant and 27.7 items to workers in its
Pittsfield, Massachusetts plant.68
To its many admirers, this bargaining strategy is a long overdue
assertion of management'sright to do more than react negatively to
labor's every initiative; it demonstrates management's willingness to
"do right voluntarily" by its workers and to communicate its case to
them as effectively and extensively as the union presents its own. To
the critics of Boulwarism, GE has simply put a pretty label on an obvious power play, for until recently the unions at GE have been so weak
and divided that many observers thought the company could call nearly
any tune it wished at the bargaining table. Whatever the reason, many
of the postwar settlements at GE were very close to the company's initial
offer. In 1960, however, the major union at GE, the IUE, pressed its
challenge of Boulwarism to the limit-first on the picket line, in a
strike which collapsed completely in three weeks and had little per,ceptible effect on GE's first and final offer, and then before the NLRB,
in a case so lengthy and complex that the Board decision was not
handed down until 1964.
B. The Board Decision: The Totality Approach Revisited
-the

In essence, the Board found that neither of GE's principal tactics
first and final- offer or the communications program-was a vio-

68 Typical, cbminnications inclided' letters to workers' homes, leaflets, and newspaper ad rtisements. 150 -N.L.R.B. at 219 & n.19.
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lation of section 8(a)(5), but when taken together in total context, they
constituted evidence of management's refusal to bargain in good faith.
In criticising the first tactic, offering a "fair and firm" proposal at
the outset, the Board insisted that it was not requiring all employers
to start low and bargain upward as proof of their good faith, but it
reserved the right to appraise a significant departure from "normal"
negotiating tactics as circumstantial evidence of an employer's state
of mind.
This "bargaining" approach [used by GE] undoubtedly eliminates
the "ask-and-bid" or "auction" form of bargaining, but in the
process devitalizes negotiations and collective bargaining and robs
them of their commonly accepted meaning. "Collective bargaining" as thus practiced is tantamount to mere formality and serves
to transform the role of the statutory representative from a joint
participant in the 'bargaining process to that of an adviser. In
practical effect, Respondent's "bargaining" position is akin to
that of a party who enters into negotiations "with a predetermined
resolve not to budge from an initial position," an attitude inconsistent with good-faith bargaining.69
As for GE's defense that it obviously wanted to and did reach an
agreement with the IUE, the Board stressed that "a party who enters
into bargaining negotiations with a 'take-it-or-leave-it' attitude violates
its duty to bargain although it goes through the forms of bargaining,
does not insist on any illegal or nonmandatory bargaining proposals,
70
and wants to sign an agreement."
Concerning GE's practice of extensive communication with employees during negotiations, the Board presumably agreed with the trial
examiner's analysis that although it is not inherently unlawful for an
employer to communicate to his employees his bargaining positions,
the progress of the bargaining, or criticism of the union, these communications do reveal the employer's frame of mind.7 1
For a summary of the numerous and varied messages that GE
directed toward its employees in 1960, the intermediate report is again
the best source:
[T]he Respondent through its extensive employee communication
system (a) anticipated the Union's major bargaining demands long
before the start of negotiations and began to condition employee
69 Id. at 195-96 (footnotes omitted).
70 Id. at 194 (footnote omitted). The Board also pointed out that if a party's desire

for an agreement were the only touchstone of its good faith, then section 8(b)(3), which
imposes a parallel bargaining obligation on the unions, would make little sense, for unions
always want an agreement. Id. at 197 and 267 (intermediate report).
71 Id. at 274 (intermediate report).
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attitudes to a favorable reception of its views and rejection of the
Union's conflicting positions; (b) after the presentation of the
Union's demands but before the actual start of negotiations,
vigorously criticized the Union's demands as endangering job
security and questioned the motives of the IUE leadership; (c) during the negotiations, continued along the lines above indicated,
and, in addition, presented, at some plants practically on a daily
basis, reports on the progress of negotiations, highly slanted in its,
favor; and (d) following the presentation of its offer deluged employees with communications designed to induce them to pressure
the Union into acceptance of its offer, to discredit the motives and
integrity of the IUE leadership, and to achieve other objectives .... 72
The communications program undoubtedly reflects that the Respondent sought primarily to deal with the Union through the
employees rather than with the employees through the Union, thus
distorting the accepted approach. 7
A majority of the Board endorsed, in effect, the trial examiner's appraisal of the motives underlying GE's communication program, 74 and
then summarized their principal finding:
In short, both major facets of Respondent's 1960 "bargaining"
technique, its campaign among the employees and its conduct at
the bargaining table, complementing each other, were calculated
to disparage the Union and to impose without substantial alteration Respondent's "fair and firm" proposal, rather than to satisfy
the true standards of good-faith collective bargaining required by
the statute.7 5
C. Pitfalls of the Totality Doctrine
The GE case obviously poses a very subtle test of the employer's
duty to bargain in good faith. The Board's opinion-and particularly
the intermediate report-present a powerful indictment of Boulwarism,
76
and yet the end result is one of uncertainty.
Some uncertainty, for example, must surely be engendered by the
censorious reaction of the Board majority and the trial examiner to the
company's communications. What is so reprehensible about the fact
that a company's propaganda during negotiations was "highly slanted
in its favor," or "vigorously criticized the Union's demands as endanId. at 273 (intermediate report).
Id. at 274 (intermediate report).
74 Id. at 195-96.
75 Id. at 196.
76 As Member Leedom plaintively dissented: "I do not mean to suggest that the issue
of good or bad faith has any clear-cut answer here. My position is not dictated so much
by strong conviction as by uncertainty." Id. at 203.
72
73
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gering job security," or was aimed at inducing the workers to vote for
the company offer against the advice of their representatives-or even
tried to "discredit the motives and integrity" of the union leadership?
It is common knowledge that such brickbats are heaved by one or both
of the parties in many negotiations and are usually discounted as standard ploys in the bargaining ritual. The Board offers an appealing
reformulation of section 8(a)(5) in its statement that "the employer's
statutory obligation is to deal with the employees through the union,
and not with the union through the employees," 77 but in practice this
is not a very helpful guide for judging the motives underlying a conpany's otherwise legal propaganda campaign. Indeed, if an employer
communicates at all with his employees during negotiations, what other
motive is he likely to have except influencing "the union through the
employees?" And even if one accepts the questionable characterization
of GE's communications program as "distorting the accepted approach"
to bargaining, is good faith to be equated only with prevailing practice?
Another source of uneasiness is the Board's attempt to infer a takeit-or-leave-it attitude from GE's tactic of a "first, full offer," without
condemning the tactic as a per se violation or passing on the adequacy
of the offer itself. The Board's motives are completely admirable; it
should not tell the parties how to negotiate or what a "fair contract" is.
Yet, the alternative tests used by the Board are scarcely preferable.
The GE approach at the bargaining table was condemned not for
its novelty or per se illegality, but because it "devitalizes negotiations
and collective bargaining and robs them of their commonly accepted
meaning." Why this stress on the "commonly accepted meaning" of
bargaining as a test of good faith? In essence, that is the standard which
employers have been urging on the Board for thirty years in opposition
to union pressure to extend the range of mandatory bargaining subjects beyond those "commonly accepted" at the moment. The Board
rightfully rejected that conservative standard in appraising labor's innovations at the bargaining table, 8 and it should be rejected in appraising
management's innovations. Otherwise the widely hailed development
of the continuous-bargaining technique in other industries might also
be condemned since it is designed to avoid the "commonly accepted"
practice of deadline negotiation.
Although it is plausible to argue, as the Board does, that a party's
proven desire to reach an agreement is not definitive evidence of its
77 Id. at 195.

78 See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Inland Steel
Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
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good- faith, this principle is difficult to defend without reference to the
content of the agreement in question. As noted earlier, it is most persuasive when applied to a company. that desires agreement only on
terms so blatantly "unfair" that they, constitute a demand for conducting employee relations on a nonunion bksis.79
This principle is far less persuasive when applied to a:compiny
such as GE; that desires agreement "on its own terms," but the terms
are roughly similar to those being negotiAedin comparable'barGAihin
relationships. The 1960 strike; for examplej:,was in response to GE's
"first and final" offer of a comprehensive, three-year contract that provided for a dues checkoff (but not a union shop),, two wage' increases
(of three and four percent), improvements in existing pentsion and insurance programs, and a new '"Income Extension Aid" program for
retraining, layoff and severance pay, tuition aid,, and similar feafures&
The Board made no attempt to appraise this proposalP0 but simply
reiterated the principle that a party's desire' to reach an -agreement is
not necessarily proof of its good faith. This puts the Board in an anomalous posture: if a company's ,final offer is niggardly,. its content may
be used as evidence of "surface"bargaining" and bad faith, -but if the
offer is relatively good, its content is irrelevant to. the issue.
Of course a good offer is not conclusive proof of good faith.' any
offer can be attended by other violations such as -a refusal to furnish
required information to the union-an actual occurrence in the
GE -case. Howe- er, in' any appraisal of an :employer's "overall -approach to and conduct of bargaining," the employer's offer is"just, as
relevant when its content is reasonably good as when it is unreasonably
bad. In neither case should'the Board assume that it cannot scrutinize
the substance of the parties' proposals for evidence of good faith,' and
it certainly should not adopt this approach in one set of circumstances
and abandon it in another.8 '
79 The NLRB and the First Circuit leveled precisely this charge against the company
in the second Reed & Prince case, and even thenhad to strain to find bad faith underlying

a management offer that was tough but not outrageous.
80 The proposal was accepted by 43 other unions, including eight AFL-CIO' locals
then negotiating with GE. Jacobs, The Showdown at G.E., Ti REPORmR, Oct. 27, 1960,
at 35.
81 It is interesting to speculate how the Board would rule on an. 8(b)(3) charge that
th 'union "goes through the foris of bargaining, does not insist on any illegal br nonmandatory proposals, and wants to sign an agreement," but only one matching the terms
of an existing area or industry pattern. Is this take-it-or-leave-it bargaining, or merely the
"accepted approach" to bargaining in many follower relationships? Apparently, the Board
has never -passed on such a case of ."union Boulwarism/' although 'its practice is surely
more extensive than the management-versin.
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, Finally, the GE case again reveals the fatal weaknesses in the remedy to which the Board's reasoning inevitably leads in such cases.
Stripped of the details concerning, the minor per se violations, the
remedy in GE consisted solely of a directive to the company to cease
and desist' from violating 8(a)(5).2'But *hat does that mean? Presumably the ,company need not play, the start-low-and--retreat-upwards
game at the bargaining table, since the -Boardstudiously refused to rule
illegal the "first, full offer" tactic. Nor does the company have to give
up the employee communication campaign or reduce its volume to
some specified percentage, or alter its content in some identifiable way
-for the communications program was viewed by ,the Board only as
a clue to GE's frame of mind.
Thus, like Reed & Prince, the GE decision imparts only an exhortation to the GE management to change its frame of mind without
necessarily changing any of its actions. Eow equitable or effective is -a
decree that offers neither the company nor the union any guide whatever by, which to judge the legality, of management's future actions?
And how can such a decision even remotely offer the union any amends
for management's actions in the past, if those actions, were in fact
,'
I I
illegal?
1. The basic deficiency in the GE remedy is not an inevitable failure
of an attempt to police motives. In the ordinary 8(a)(3) case, for example, the Board must also infer from surrounding circumstances an employer's motives in performing an, act that may be perfectly legal, such
as discharging aworker. When the Board finds an improper motive
present in such a case, however, it offers an affirmative remedy to the
injured party, such as reinstatement ,and usually issues'some understandable guides for. future avoidance of the offense. Even in the difficult first-contract cases; such as Reed & Prince, the Board can at least
go through ,the motions of ordering the offending management back
to the bargaining table. But this action has no relevance or effect if
applied to General Electric.,
In short, the Board decision in the GE case dearly illustrates the
hazards of pressing the totality doctrine to its extreme. For at that point,
the Board is in the anomalous position of finding a party guilty of
everything in general and nothing in particular. Surely, something is
'amiss when the Board feels ableto condemn a party's "overall approach
to and conduct of bargaining" and yet is unable to make even token
amends to the party presumably injured by that approach in the past,
82

150 N.L.R.B. at 197-98, 284-87.

.
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and is unable to tell the offending party how it should alter its behavior
in the future.
III
A PROPOSAL FOR GOOD FAITH TESTS AND REMEDIES
The Board's totality-of-conduct approach leaves unanswered, in
the Reed & Prince situation, how to produce meaningful collective
bargaining in first-contract negotiations, and in the General Electric
situation, how prospectively to conform to law the parties' collective
bargaining relationship. The results lead to another, more basic issue.
The Board's effort has been to make collective bargaining function as
a process by which the union can achieve a significant voice in the
management of an enterprise's employment conditions. Accordingly,
"Boulwarism" is bad because its effective practice by an employer produces a union which is neurotic due to its inability to "deliver" to
the employees more than what the employer is already prepared to pay.
The Reed & Prince situation is likewise subject to condemnation because of the employer's success in preventing the union from ever getting off the ground as an effectively functioning institution.
Thus, if the assurance of status and success for the union is indeed
an aim of our labor policy, the Board's present approach is ineffective.
But it is not at all dear that it is or should be the aim of the law to
strengthen an ineffective union or to cure a "neurotic" one under the
guise of applying a duty to bargain in good faith. "Boulwarism," in
other words, may be poor labor relations, but is it for that reason
illegal?
One independent study group concluded that legislation cannot
realistically bring good faith to the bargaining table.8 3 This position
minimally implies deletion of the "good faith" requirement from the
Act, or it may imply elimination of the duty to bargain entirely, leaving
the questions of whether bargaining takes place, how it is conducted,
and what results are produced, completely to the interplay of the relative strength of the parties.
While this solution, especially in its more extreme form, has the
appealing virtue of simplicity, neither elimination of the good faith
test nor the more radical proposal is required or desirable. The good
faith test, however, needs to be applied in a fashion both narrower and
sharper than the free wheeling and ineffective totality-of-conduct technique.
83 INDEPENDENT STUDY

GROUP, cOMMITEE FOR ECONoMIc DEVELOPMENT,

INTEsr IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 82

(1961).

THlE PUBuC
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A. Identifiable Offenses Approach
The NLRB, therefore, in enforcing the duty to bargain, should
be required to identify clearly the conduct it deems illegal. If it can
find no such illegal conduct, no violation of the Act should be found.
If illegal conduct is found to have been committed, the determination,
depending upon the facts, may or may not be accompanied by a finding
of bad faith. Thus, for example, an employer's honest mistake as to the
nonbargainability of a subject later deemed to be within the area of
mandatory bargaining, would constitute a per se violation of the Act
not involving bad faith. In contrast, some of the employer's conduct
in the second Reed & Prince case, such as the factual misrepresentation
of the company's leave of absence policy, could be the sort of illegal
bargaining posture which might support a finding of bad faith.
This approach admittedly restricts the scope and significance of
the good faith concept that was, after all, retained by the 1947 Act
instead of the House version's purely objective standards.84 Its adoption,
however, is a price worth paying to eliminate the uncertainties engendered by the totality-of-conduct approach. Indeed, the restricted application of the good faith concept more closely approaches the 1947 Congressional intent, which was, despite the retention of a subjective test,
to inhibit the degree of NLRB supervision of the bargaining process.
Thus, the House Conference Report stated that the duty to bargain
was not meant
to compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of any concession. Hence, the Senate amendment, while
it did not prescribe a purely objective test of what constituted
collective bargaining, as did the House bill, had to a very substantial extent the same effect as the House bill in this regard,
since it rejected, as a factor in determining good faith, the test of
making a concession and thus prevented the Board from determining the merits of the positions of the parties.8 5
B. Reasonableness of the BargainingProposals Themselves
Moreover, an added dimension should be ,given to the good faith
concept which, although perhaps somewhat expanding upon the House
Conference Report statement, is nevertheless more compatible with it
84 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2(11) (1947). These standards included the duty
to receive and discuss proposals and counterproposals, to reduce agreements reached to
writing, and to precede strikes or lock-outs by a strike vote of the employees. They explicitly excluded a duty to reach agreement, accept proposals or counterproposals, or to

submit counterproposals.
85 H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 34 (1947), reprinted in N.L.R.B., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT 505, 538 (1948).
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than the fuzzy totality-of-conduct test.-The substance of a' bargainxig
proposalshould be evaluated and goodor bad faith inferred from it
to the extent that it is clearly reasonable or unreasonable. -.Thps, an
employer's excessively niggai-dly ,bargaining offer, adamantly adhered
,to,.should be available to support a finding,of bad.,f th bargaining. On
the other hand, a reasonably fair offer, advanced and defended with
similar adamancy, should not be ;ewed as incons.stent 1with good faith
bargaining. In line with this analysis, an employer's making no counterproposal could support a conclusion.that he is bargaining in bad faith
or not bargaining at all. Using the good faith. concept in this manner
will undoubtedly produc,close questions. For instance, should the
Board ;act when a previously ' non-unionized employer endeayors,
through tough bargaining, to. maintain the advantages, of his, earlier
non-union wage differential. -Insuch a case, so long as the employer is
meeting and,treating with the union, is not asserting clearly unreasonable bargaining ,positions, and is not committing other unfair labor
practices, the Board's posture ought to be one of caiutious circumspection rather than zealous fervor in finding bad, faith.-., : . .
It seems appropriate for the Board to. conclude that,,a proposed
substantial wage reduction is evidence of bad faith, or that a comprehensive bargaining offer,, approximating current settlements else'wyere,
is consistent with good. faith bargaining. On. the terhad, it seems
much more problematical for the NLRB to enjoy a hunting license to
ferret out, as it did, in the second Reed & Prince case, a sequence of
picayune incidents (such as the bulletin board coritroversy 'and the use
of a stenotypist) for the purpose of finding bad Ifaith.
G. Remedies to Suit the Violation
With the good, faith concept thus refined, the Board may'find fewer
breaches of the duty to bargain, but, being required to pin-point unlawful conduct, it would be in an improved position to remedy violations
of the law. Furthermore,' utilizatioh of -this approach should; in situatioris justifying them, be combined-with remedies sharper than a mere
prospective cease and desist order. The cease and, desist order may be
sufficient for inadvertent per se violations or.for cases in which the evidence of bad faith is relatively insignificant. When evidence of violation
.is
clear and extensive, or when bad faiff, bargaining is aggravated by
other unfair labor.practices, however, resort should be had to prelimihaty injunctie"fe tief,' or to retroactive compensatory relief of the soft
currpntly beingurged upon the Boardin refusal-to-bargain cases.
The NLRB is presently considering the question of making retro-
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active compensatory relief available in refusal-to-bargain situations.8 6
The proposed iemedy'stated by the trial' examiner in the lx-Cell-O
case, would require the ermployer to '1[c]ompensate . . its employees
for the monetary value of the minimum additional benefits... which
it is reasonable to conclude that the Union would have been able to
obtain through collective bargaining .. for the period commencing
with the date of the Respondent's formal refusal to bargain.. ...87
'To be sure, the Board's authority to' afford suich relief is being
sharply contested. There is,-also debate over whether the relief should
be -madeavailable in all' cases, including, those in which an employer
refuses to bargain merely because he desires to secure judicial review
of a Board ruling iA a fepregentation proceeding, or limited to aggraiated refusalto-bargaini sitati6ns:The latter is consistent With the
proposal here.
,Difficult problems of calculating the amount of compensatory re:
lief are also likely to7'arise. However, since the Board can recognize a
dearly unreasonable bargaining stance, and an eminently reasonable
one, calculation of what the uni6n could reasonably have achieved, had
there beeii good faith bargaining'should'also be possible.
.,:.Furthermore,combining the Ex-Cell-O remedy'with the proposed
narroWed-good-falth test, and limiting it to egregious instances of lack
of good -faith, would render the remedy a more dearly appropriate
&ercise of statutOry:discretion and authority on'the part of the Board,
and might thus enhance its chances of judicial' acceptance. Indeed, if
the remedy is not accepted by the courts, even in aggravated cases, the
diffidulties unearthed inthis aftide suggest the necessity of a statutory
amendment 'enhancing the Board's remedial powers; and possibly extending them to include punitive damages for flagrant refusal-to-bargainsituations.
The. combined requirement of greater precision, in finding violations of-the duty to bargain, of dearer direction to the parties as- to
h6W they failed'to discharge this duty, and of speedier and more comprehensive remedies in serious cases would, result in fairer and more
effective enforcement of good faith in labor negotiations.
86 See, e.g., Ex-Cell-O Corp., NLRB Trial Exam. Dec. 80-67 (Case No. 25-CA-2377,
1967); Zinke's Foods, Inc., NLR-B Trial Exam. Dec, 662-66 (Cases No. 30-CA-372, SO-RC-400,
1966); Herman Wilson Lumber Co., NLRB Trial Exam. Dec. 757-66 (Case No. 26-CA-2536,
1966); Rasco Olympia Inc., NLRB Trial Exam. Dec..167-66 (Cse No. 19-CA-3187, 1966).
.7 Ex-Ceil-o Corp., NLRB TrWia.Exm. Pec. 80-07, 1 (Case No. 25-CA-2377, 1967).

